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Introduction
With millions of computers now in use in both homes and busi-
nesses, there is a large and growing market for computer add-ons and
peripherals. Because these add-ons typically work by integrating new
features into the functionality of older hardware and software products,
producers of add-ons have been understandably concerned that their
add-on products may infringe the copyrights of the products with which
they interact by creating infringing derivative works. A series of recent
Ninth Circuit cases, including most prominently Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,I have responded to this concern by reinter-
preting and applying the doctrines that ordinarily arise in derivative
works litigation. In this article we examine when computer add-ons
should and should not be considered infringing derivative works under
the Galoob decision and other authorities.
We begin by examining the definition of computer add-ons and the
commercial interests that have recently pushed add-on litigation into the
spotlight. We move next to an exposition and analysis of the doctrines
that proved critical to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Galoob that a
specific computer add-on, the "Game Genie," was not an infringing de-
rivative work. These doctrines include the statutory and common law
definitions of a derivative work and the fair use defense. Finally, in the
course of this analysis we attempt to point out how each of these doc-
trines can be, and should be, refined to continue the laudable trend to-
ward a limiting construction of the derivative works right in the context
of computer add-ons.
I
What Is an Add-On?
Computer "add-ons" are products designed to enhance the utility of
existing computer hardware or software products (primary products) by
adding features or enhancing the operation of existing features. Familiar
examples of add-ons include programs that supplement word processing
programs by adding spelling correction or citation correction features,
programs that add to or enhance the quality of screen displays or print
output, library databases that support other programs with everything
from statistical information to archives of graphic images, and network-
ing products that allow existing hardware and software products to com-
municate and operate in a network environment.
1. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
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These familiar examples, however, by no means exhaust the scope of
products covered by any legal rules that may regulate add-ons. Even
products that ordinarily are considered primary products may fall within
the definition of add-ons ultimately adopted by the courts, because the
vast majority of computer products are designed to operate (or are able
to operate) as parts of larger computer systems. Basic word processing
programs, such as WordPerfect® or Microsoft Word®, operate by ad-
ding word processing functionality to personal computers and system
software developed by, for example, IBM and Apple Computer. Simi-
larly, video screens, printers, modems, and many other hardware prod-
ucts operate by adding features to or enhancing the operation of a stand-
alone central processing unit. Because most computer products are
designed to be interoperable components of larger systems, copyright
doctrines that regulate the ability of third parties to develop add-ons that
operate in conjunction with primary products have implications for
nearly all computer products.
Until recently the interrelatedness of most computer products has
not resulted in significant litigation involving derivative works claims.
While we cannot be certain why this is so, the apparent reason is that
most producers of primary computer products have actively encouraged
third parties to develop higher-level computer products as a way of stim-
ulating the market for their primary products. The widely recounted
philosophy of Apple Computer, Inc., is illustrative. Apple executives be-
lieved that the development of applications and add-on enhancements by
third parties was critical to the success of Apple's computers. Conse-
quently, Apple encouraged outside developers by producing the Apple
"toolbox" of standard routines that developers could use to create com-
patible products and by pursuing its widely publicized philosophy of
product development "evangelism." 2
Recently, however, other companies have taken a different ap-
proach. For example, manufacturers of home video game computers,
such as Nintendo of America, Inc. (Nintendo), and Sega of America,
Inc., have recognized that, once a manufacturer of primary products
achieves substantial market penetration, the tables turn. With millions of
Nintendo's video game computers installed, Nintendo no longer needs
third parties to stimulate the market for its computers by developing
games. Instead, to enter the market for games, third-party developers
need to render their video game products compatible with the installed
2. Former Apple employee and Macintosh developer Guy Kawasaki has summarized
Apple's philosophy of "evangelizing" third party developers as: "Make your money on the
camera. Let your friends sell the processing and film." Guy KAWASAKI, Evangelism, in THE
MACINTOSH WAY, at 105 (1990).
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base of millions of Nintendo computers. Instead of subsidizing add-on
developers, Nintendo now seeks to impose, in essence, access fees on add-
on developers who want to enter the market for home video games.
More broadly, any proprietor whose hardware or software becomes the
dominant, or even a relatively common, operating environment may wish
to impose economic or other controls on access to that environment for
additional products that interact with it.
Copyright law generally, and the derivative works right in particu-
lar, is one of the tools relied on heavily by Nintendo to extract access fees
in the form of copyright royalties from third-party developers. Section
106(2) of Title 171 grants copyright holders the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. In an effort to con-
trol the market for add-ons, Nintendo has adopted an aggressive litiga-
tion strategy that includes asserting claims against add-ons based on
allegations that the add-ons are, or contribute to the creation of, alleg-
edly infringing derivative works.
For example, in the recently decided Galoob case, Nintendo con-
fronted an unlicensed add-on marketed by Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
(Lewis Galoob Toys) known as the Game Genie.4 The Game Genie is a
hardware and software device that can be inserted by the user between
Nintendo's video game computer and cartridges containing game pro-
grams.' The Genie monitors the data flow between Nintendo's computer
and the game cartridge. When the computer seeks information from the
cartridge that the user wants to enhance (when, for example, the com-
puter asks for the number of lives to be granted an action character), the
Game Genie augments the data flow with information instructing the
computer to grant "Super Mario" five lives instead of three.
In the Galoob suit, Nintendo charged that Lewis Galoob Toys di-
rectly violated Nintendo's exclusive right to create derivative works by
creating the Game Genie, and that Galoob was a contributory infringer
3. Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).




by encouraging users to create derivative works every time they used the
Game Genie.6
As described later, the district court and the Ninth Circuit ulti-
mately rejected Nintendo's argument. Nonetheless, there is good reason
to believe that other primary products producers may soon be following
Nintendo's example. As the installed base of all types of computers
grows, more and more producers will find themselves in a position that is
more analogous to Nintendo's than to Apple's; they will find themselves
less dependent on third-party developers to stimulate a market for their
primary products and with increasing power to control access to the lu-
crative secondary market created by a substantial installed base of pri-
mary products. If this shift occurs, as we think it will, then it is likely
that an increasing number of companies will embrace the litigation strat-
egy Nintendo has pursued. As a result, the interpretation and applica-
tion of the derivative works right will become increasingly important not
only to add-on producers, but also to the producers of all computer prod-
ucts that operate in conjunction with other primary hardware and
software products.
II
When Is an Add-On a Potentially Infringing Derivative Work?
When should a software or hardware add-on be considered a poten-
tially infringing derivative work?7 The answer to this question begins
with the statutory definition of derivative work provided in section 101 of
the Copyright Act:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fic-
tionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduc-
tion, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is also a "derivative
work." 8
This definition is only the beginning of the analysis, however, be-
cause the definition is admitted by all to be hopelessly overbroad. As one
court observed in the context of litigation among Apple, Microsoft, and
6. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. By "potentially infringing," we mean that the work in question meets the criteria for
infringement, but may nonetheless be privileged based upon one or more of the affirmative
defenses and exemptions stated in sections 107 through 120 of the Copyright Act. Two of
these sections, section 107 and section 117, are discussed infra at notes 68-117 and accompany-
ing text.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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others, "[a]ll works are derived to a certain degree from pre-existing
works."9 As a result, the statutory definition of derivative works as
works that are in any way "based on," "recast," "transformed," or
"adapted" from prior work would, without further limitation, define
nearly all works-and certainly all computer add-ons-to be derivative
works.
To cure the overbreadth of the statutory definition, case law has
supplemented the statutory definition of derivative works with an ad hoc
series of limitations. These limitations are articulated differently in dif-
ferent settings and, until the Ninth Circuit's decision in Galoob, there
was a question as to how the definition of derivative works would be
construed in the context of computer add-ons. In Galoob, the Ninth Cir-
cuit construed the derivative works doctrine to find that neither the
Game Genie, nor the audiovisual displays created with the aid of the
Game Genie, were derivative works. The analysis relied on by the Ninth
Circuit to reach this result highlights four restrictions from case law that
narrow the broad definition of derivative works in the context of com-
puter add-ons:
1. An infringing derivative work must incorporate protectable mater-
ials from the primary or underlying work.
2. An infringing derivative work must be a "work" "embodied in a
concrete form."
3. An infringing derivative work must be "substantially similar" to
the primary work.
4. An infringing derivative work must supplant or satisfy market de-
mand for the protected expression fixed in the primary work.
Below, we examine these four limitations and their implications in some
detail.
A. A Derivative Work Must Incorporate Protectable Materials from the
Primary Work
It is generally established that the exclusive rights granted the copy-
right holder to a primary work, including the exclusive right to create
derivative works, relate only to those features of the primary work that
are protected by copyright.10 Consequently, in the Galoob decision, the
9. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
10. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985) ("To constitute a violation of section 106(2) the infringing work must incorporate
in some form a portion of the copyrighted work."). Not all courts have followed this rule. In
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986),
plaintiff Worlds of Wonder manufactured a toy bear, Teddy Ruxpin, that contained a cassette
tape player inside the bear, as well as cassette tapes designed to play in the bear. One track of
each tape contained a fairy tale; another track contained digital codes that caused the bear to
move its mouth, head, and limbs to match the story. Defendant Vector Intercontinental mar-
keted its own cassette tapes containing original stories and movement codes. Despite the fact
1993]
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rule that a derivative work must incorporate protected material from the
primary work was recited and applied without much discussion."1 As
described above, while the Game Genie must be operated in conjunction
with Nintendo's products, it does not incorporate any of Nintendo's
materials within itself, and as a result the Ninth Circuit held that the
Game Genie was not a "derivative work."
The Ninth Circuit's soft-spoken application of this rule to computer
add-ons, however, has at least two implications in that context that are
worthy of more attention. First, the Galoob opinion implies that add-ons
do not become derivative works simply because they are designed to
work with other copyrighted programs. The Game Genie must be used
in conjunction with Nintendo's copyrighted works in order to function.
Yet in Galoob, the Ninth Circuit ignored this, focusing on the fact that
the Game Genie never stores Nintendo material within itself, and found
that the Game Genie was not a derivative work. A significant implica-
tion of the Galoob ruling, then, is that computer add-ons do not become
derivative works merely because they are component works that depend
upon their ability to interact with other copyrighted computer products.
Unless the add-on incorporates protected material within itself, the
Ninth Circuit held, the add-on cannot be an infringing derivative work.
With regard to this first implication, Galoob reaches a result that is
surely correct: because nearly all computer products are designed to
work as interoperable components of larger computer systems, an indi-
rect theory of incorporation would find that nearly all computer products
are derivative works. While possibly enriching the copyright holder of
one or two primary products, an indirect theory of incorporation would
stifle innovation in a field where technical progress is typically made in-
crementally, and where innovations often appear in the market first as
interoperable add-ons that are later incorporated as standard features of
larger products.
The rule that an add-on must incorporate protected material from
the primary work to be a derivative work has a second and equally im-
portant implication. This rule links the scope of the derivative works
right with recent cases that have significantly narrowed the scope of pro-
that nothing in defendant's tapes was copied from plaintiff's tapes, the court found the tapes to
be infringing derivative works based on the similarity of the overall sound and appearance of
the bear while playing defendant's tapes to the sound and appearance of the bear while playing
plaintiff's. The Worlds of Wonder analysis has not been followed, and has been criticized by
some commentators. See, e.g., Christian H. Nadan, Note, A Proposal to Recognize Component
Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1633
(1990).
11. "A derivative work must incorporate a protected work in some concrete or permanent
'form.' " Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967 (emphasis added); see also id. at 969.
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tection provided by copyright for computer programs. 12 In Computer
Associates International v. Altai, Inc., for example, the Second Circuit
construed the idea/expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine in the
context of computer programs and held that program features mandated
by (1) industry standards, (2) principles of efficiency, or (3) the "compati-
bility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed
to operate" are not protected by copyright.13 Because an add-on must
incorporate protected material from the primary work to be a derivative
work, Computer Associates has significant implications for add-ons: com-
puter add-ons that incorporate features that are industry standards, re-
quired to establish compatibility, or dictated by efficiency should not be
considered derivative works, because these add-ons do not incorporate
material protected by copyright. If the trend toward decreasing the
scope of copyright protection for computer programs continues, then the
range of materials that can be incorporated in computer add-ons will
increase even further.
B. An Infringing Derivative Work Need Not Be Original or Fixed, But
Must Be a Work Embodied in a Concrete Form
The second limitation on the definition of derivative works in
Galoob is that a derivative work must be a work embodied in a perma-
nent or concrete form, but need not be a work that is original or fixed.14
This apparently self-contradictory requirement is best understood in the
context of the Galoob decision. After disposing of the argument that the
Game Genie itself was an infringing derivative work, the Ninth Circuit
turned to address Nintendo's second and central argument: that the au-
diovisual displays created with the assistance of the Game Genie were
derivative works, and that defendant Lewis Galoob Toys was a contribu-
tory infringer that provided consumers the means to infringe.15
Lewis Galoob Toys replied to this charge by arguing that the alleg-
edly infringing audiovisual displays did not meet the statutory require-
ment of fixation set out in section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.16 Section
102(a) provides that copyright protection shall only extend to original
12. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega
Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown Bag Software v. Sy-
mantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
13. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 710.
14. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967-68.
15. Id. at 967-69; see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
16. Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1286.
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works fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 17 Moreover, section
101 provides that a work of any kind is not "created" until it is fixed in a
copy or phonorecord for the first time,' 8 and requires that for a work to
be fixed it must take a form that "is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration."' 9 Based on these statutory
provisions and certain legislative records,2" Lewis Galoob Toys argued
that audiovisual displays created with the aid of the Game Genie were
never fixed for a period of more than transitory duration, and therefore
could not be works of any kind, much less infringing derivative works.2'
Initially the Ninth Circuit rejected Lewis Galoob's argument. The
court found that the Copyright Act provides two separate statutory defi-
nitions for the term "derivative work.",22 When a party seeks to register
a copyright in a derivative work, such as when the author of a play based
on a novel seeks to copyright that play, the definition of a derivative
work must be read in conjunction with section 102(a) and the other pro-
visions discussed above.23 Where, however, a copyright holder brings an
action for infringement of the exclusive right to create derivative works,
the statutory restrictions of section 102(a), including originality and fixa-
tion, do not apply, because the plaintiff does not seek copyright protec-
tion for the derivative work but only a finding that the derivative work
infringes.24
17. Section 102(a) provides in relevant part: "Copyright protection subsists, in accord-
ance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1976).
18. Section 101 states in relevant part:
A work is "created" when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; when
a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any
particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
Id. § 101.
19. Id. (definition of "fixed").
20. Specifically with regard to evanescent computer images and temporary memory, Con-
gress has stated that "the definition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanes-
cent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'mem-
ory' of a computer." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
21. This argument was accepted and adopted by the district court. Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
22. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967-68.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Having discarded the fixation requirement under section 102(a), the
Ninth Circuit seemed poised to find for Nintendo and hold that the eva-
nescent screen images created by consumers of the Game Genie are de-
rivative works. But the Ninth Circuit did not do this. Instead, it re-
examined the statutory definition of derivative works offered in section
101 and found an independent fixation requirement of sorts built into the
statutory definition of derivative works.25 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
carefully reviewed the examples of derivative works provided in section
101 and found that these examples shared the trait of being works that
physically embodied protected features of the primary work in a more or
less permanent form.26 The court concluded that, while a derivative
work need not be fixed or original in order to infringe, it does have to be
embodied in "some concrete or permanent form." Because audiovisual
images created with the aid of the Game Genie were never stored in tem-
porary or permanent memory, these images were never sufficiently "em-
bodied" and could not be derivative works within the meaning of section
101.27
The implications of this second restriction announced in Galoob for
computer add-ons other than the Game Genie are not entirely clear, for
two reasons. First, the notion of "embodiment in a permanent or con-
crete form" is vague. Of course, any add-on that integrates protected
material with material added by the add-on and stores this integrated
work in a permanent memory device probably has become both a fixed
work and a work "embodied in permanent or concrete form."
'28
There are, however, many forms of memory with varying degrees of
permanence, and it is not clear how these alternatives will be viewed.
Many add-on programs run in a memory resident mode wherein the add-
25. Id. at 968.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 969.
28. On this basis the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969. In Artic, the Seventh Circuit considered two different circuit board
kits marketed by the defendant for use with plaintiff's Pac Man and Galaxian arcade video
games. 704 F.2d at 1011-12. One of these kits (Pac Man) involved the use of a cumulative
integrated copy that combined the primary program with additional code, while the other
(Galaxian) involved the addition of a chip containing only additional code that accelerated the
speed of play. The Seventh Circuit found both kits to be infringing derivative works. Id. at
1014. Apparently interpreting as one the situations of the Galaxian and Pac Man kits, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Artic by explaining that both
kits created integrated works that were "embodied in permanent or concrete form," and that
the kits were thus different from the transient audiovisual displays created with the aid of the
Game Genie. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969. Because it is not clear that both of the kits at issue in
Artic created integrated works embodied in concrete form, the Galoob decision may be better
read as a rejection of Artic per se rather than a decision based on distinguished facts.
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on and the primary program are both stored at different memory loca-
tions in the same computer, and a single integrated program is never
created or stored in memory. We believe that these memory resident
programs are analogous to the Game Genie, and should be considered
independent works that run contemporaneously with a primary work but
never incorporate that work in primary form. It is by no means certain,
though, that the Ninth Circuit will reach this result in future cases. Sim-
ilarly, computer add-ons may operate by creating integrated works that
are stored only at temporary memory locations and are erased every time
the program is completed. We believe these temporary memory loca-
tions are analogous to the evanescent screen displays, which the Galoob
panel found were too transient to constitute derivative works. In view of
the many and varied forms of temporary memory, however, the persua-
siveness of this analogy will also likely depend on the particular facts of
each case.29
Setting aside the vagueness problem, the "embodied in concrete
form" limitation articulated by Galoob is also troubling because it as-
sumes that the concept of "derivative work" should have two definitions:
one definition that requires fixation and originality when an author seeks
protection for derivative works, and another holding that fixation and
originality are not required when a copyright holder seeks to prove that a
third party has created an allegedly infringing derivative work. This as-
sumption may be flawed.
The rationale for this dual definition of derivative works apparently
originates in versions of the Copyright Act that preceded the 1976 revi-
sions. Those versions, drafted without an eye toward continual techno-
logical change, excluded entire categories of works from copyright
29. The importance of the factual context has recently been demonstrated in MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 1993 WL 106411 (9th Cir. April 7, 1993). In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held that an independent computer repair service created an infringing copy
every time they turned on the computer they were retained to fix, because every time they
turned on the computer a copy of the copyrighted software that operated the computer was
loaded into RAM. This RAM copy, the court found, was sufficiently fixed to constitute a
".copy" under 17 U.S.C. § 101. Furthermore, because the owners of the machine had only
licensed the software, they were not "rightful owners" of a copy of the infringed work, and
thus were not protected by the provisions of § 117. The "fair use" defense is not discussed in
the opinion, apparently because counsel for defendants failed to raise the defense.
The view that programs integrated in a temporary RAM do create derivative works is
arguably supported by the 1978 Final Report of the National Commission on New Technolog-
ical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU Report), which stated that placing a program into a
computer's mass storage device, including a working RAM, may constitute the creation of a
reproduction of the program in violation of the copyright holder's exclusive right to reproduce
under section 106(1) of the Act. CONTU Report at 12-13. Section 117 was created to exempt
this potential infringement. Id.; see discussion of section 117, infra notes 104-17 and accompa-
nying text.
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protection. For example, in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co.,a° the Supreme Court found that a piano roll of a copyrighted song
was not a "copy" of the song because, under the 1891 Act, "copies" were
required to be "in a form which others can see and read." Because ordi-
nary people could not read the information recorded in the new technol-
ogy of piano rolls, the Court found that the rolls were not copies and, a
fortiori, that they could not be infringing copies.3
The common law doctrine of derivative works was established in
part to respond to the effect of technological change and to hold that
misappropriation of copyrighted expression would not be excused merely
because the allegedly infringing work takes a form that is new and unfa-
miliar to copyright, like the piano rolls in White-Smith. The Galoob
panel's holding that an infringing derivative work need not be fixed ex-
tends this traditional approach to the derivative works doctrine by
broadening the number of works that might be considered infringing de-
rivative works, and, as a result, broadening the flexibility of the court
when faced with adaptations of copyrighted expression to new media.3 2
The broad traditional approach to the derivative works right is ad-
mittedly somewhat attractive, especially when viewed in its historic con-
text. But this need for a flexible derivative works right is no longer
present in the current version of the Act. Section 106 currently defines
all of the copyright holder's exclusive rights using intentionally open-
ended and flexible terms."3 Moreover, these provisions have been flexibly
30. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
31. Id. at 17. Similarly, the Court in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911),
confronted the case of the movie Ben Hur, based upon a copyrighted book of the same name, a
year before the Act was amended to extend copyright protection to motion pictures. The
Court found that, as "dramatization" was a protected right, the manufacturers of the motion
picture were contributory infringers by virtue of having provided the mechanical means to
deliver that dramatization to the viewers. Id. at 61. See also Lone Ranger Television v. Pro-
gram Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984) (radio tapes are not copies under the
1909 Act, but infringing derivative works).
32. The intention of Congress to create broad flexibility by excluding a fixation require-
ment for infringing derivative works is arguably demonstrated by the Notes of the Committee
of the Judiciary accompanying the passage of the 1976 Act, which state:
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . .overlaps the exclusive right of
reproduction to some extent. It is broader than that right, however, in the sense that
reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of
a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be
an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 20, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675.
33. The copyright holder's exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted work, for exam-
ple, has been broadly defined to include the right to distribute by "rental, lease, ... lending" or
any "other transfer of ownership." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). "Transfer of ownership," in turn, has
been defined to include "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
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interpreted to extend, for example, the right of reproduction to encom-
pass copies of copyrighted expression in a new form or medium.a4
In view of this flexibility, nearly all of the activities that would be
reached by the discretionary traditional definition of derivative works
can now be treated more directly as falling within one of the other exclu-
sive rights enumerated in section 106. 3" The only apparent derivative
activities that fall outside the scope of the other exclusive rights enumer-
ated in section 106 are private displays and performances, such as singing
copyrighted songs at home for personal pleasure. But these activities
have been found non-infringing, 6 and there is no need to retain an over-
broad definition of derivative works simply to encompass these non-in-
fringing activities.
There is a second problem with the dual definition of derivative
works adopted in Galoob, in addition to the fact that the historic ration-
ale for such a dual definition is no longer vital. Defining infringing deriv-
ative works without reference to the fixation and originality requirements
of section 102(a) risks that courts will naively apply this broad definition
to find activities infringing that are more properly viewed as altogether
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclu-
sive license." Id. § 101.
34. In Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979), for example, de-
fendant argued that his blueprints of I Ching cards could not be infringing copies of plaintiff's
finished cards because the blueprints were in a different medium than the original cards and
because defendant never intended to sell the blueprints themselves. Id. at 863. The Ninth
Circuit flatly rejected defendant's argument and reversed the trial court's summary judgment
for defendant:
That an infringing copy may be produced in a medium different than that of the
protected work is not, in itself, a bar to recovery, nor does the fact that the blueprints
themselves were never sold for profit eliminate the possibility of an award of statu-
tory damages for infringement under the Act.
Id. at 864.
35. Activities such as "ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance," which apparently
led legislators to feel that the definition of derivative works for infringement purposes should
not require fixation, can now be directly and better addressed as infringements of the right of
public performance stated in 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). A non-fixed derivative audiovisual work,
such as the live broadcast of the "ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance," may be
properly viewed as infringing both the exclusive right of public performance and the exclusive
right of public display. Id. § 106(5). The redundancy of the derivative works right in view of
the current flexible interpretation of the copyright holder's other exclusive rights has also been
observed by commentators. Professor Nimmer, for example, finds the right to make derivative
works indistinguishable from the right to make copies. 2 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A] (1992). See also Susan A. Dunn, Note, Defining the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511 (1986) ("derivative
work provisions refine rather than enlarge the [other four] rights").
36. "No license is required by the Copyright Act ... to sing a copyrighted lyric in the
shower." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975).
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beyond the scope of copyright. The Ninth Circuit's often criticized deci-
sion in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R. T Co.37 is exemplary.
In Mirage, plaintiff Mirage Editions, Inc. (Mirage) was a publisher
who sold prints by an artist named Nagel individually and in groups in
art books.3" Defendant Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. (ART) lawfully
purchased plaintiff's books, and then resold the prints individually by
cutting them out of the book and mounting them on tiles.39 Mirage
could not sue ART for infringement of the exclusive right of distribution
because ART had lawfully purchased originals of the prints, and there-
fore had the right to resell them under the first sale doctrine.' Nor
could Mirage sue ART for creating infringing copies because ART did
not copy anything: it simply cut out originals and resold them. Indeed,
properly viewed, Mirage did not have any copyright cause of action
against ART because ART did nothing more than compete with Mirage
by reselling individually goods purchased from Mirage in bulk. Compe-
tition is not infringement, even in the market for highly expressive artis-
tic works.
But Mirage was not bereft of means to attack its competitor, because
Mirage could rely on the broad and discretionary traditional definition of
derivative works. Mirage argued that by mounting the individual prints
before resale ART had created derivative works, infringing Mirage's ex-
clusive right to do so.41 It is unlikely that the act of mounting an art
print before selling it adds sufficient originality to meet the requirements
of section 102(a), and had the definition of derivative works been con-
strued with section 102(a) in mind, the Ninth Circuit would have
reached the proper result: ART did not infringe.42 The Ninth Circuit,
37. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989).
38. Id. at 1342.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1344. The first sale doctrine is codified in section 109 and provides in relevant
part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is enti-
tled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the posses-
sion of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109.
41. 856 F.2d at 1343.
42. As a leading commentator explains:
Even apart from the questionable contribution of intellectual labor in the physical
activities of page-removal and mounting .... it is difficult to imagine that the artist
... could take separately copyrighted individual art works and, merely by reproduc-
ing them in a compilation and then taking the reproduced pages out of the compila-
tion and remounting them, thereby obtain a new copyright in the same art works.
For the sole contribution added in this process is the method of mounting; choosing
ceramic rather than cardboard as the backing material should scarcely be construed
as a "meaningful" variation in the eyes of the Copyright Act. It is therefore submit-
ted that the court's analysis [in Mirage] was in error.
1 NIMMER, supra note 35, § 3.03, at 3-13 n.23.
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however, ignored section 102(a) and concluded that simply because the
mounted prints obviously "recast" or "transformed" the unmounted
prints, ART had created infringing derivative works.43
In sum, the dual definition of derivative works is a confusing and
unnecessary surplusage. The category of works that are derivative works
for purposes of infringement but not for purposes of copyrightability can
be divided into two subclasses: those works that also infringe one of the
other four enumerated rights (including both works fixed in new media
and works that, although not fixed, are either public performances or
public displays), and works that should not be considered infringing at
all (such as private performances). In either case, a separate category of
infringing derivative works is not only unnecessary, but risks the inevita-
ble side effects of an overbroad approach to the definition of derivative
works.
C. Market Injury: Supplanting Demand and Substantial Similarity
The final two limitations on the definition of derivative works high-
lighted by Galoob are closely related, and the relationship flows from
problems that arise when the first of these two limitations (that a deriva-
tive work must be "substantially similar" to the primary work) is applied
to computer add-ons.
The "substantial similarity" restriction traditionally has been ap-
plied by the Ninth Circuit outside the context of computer add-ons." To
determine substantial similarity the Ninth Circuit applies an arcane
multi-step analysis that is too complex to describe in detail here.4" For
43. 856 F.2d at 1343-44. Moreover, while the Galoob court eschewed both the fixation
and originality requirements of section 102(a) in favor of the derivative works definition in
section 101, that definition itself contains its own originality requirement: "A work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, rep-
resent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " 17U.S.C. § 101. Thus, even
under the dual definition adopted by the Ninth Circuit, ART's mounted prints should not have
been found to be derivative works.
44. In the Ninth Circuit, "a work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be
considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a prior work had been
taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such prior work." Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961,
965, n.2 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977) (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985). In turn, "[t]o prove infringement, one must show substantial similar-
ity." Id.
45. The analysis applied in the Ninth Circuit to determine substantial similarity can be
roughly summarized as a four-step process: (I) the works at issue are analytically dissected
with the aid of expert testimony into component elements; (2) the elements are individually
analyzed for protectability, and unprotected ideas, processes, functions, scenes a faire, and so
forth are excluded; (3) the court, again with the aid of expert testimony, determines if the
works are "extrinsically" or "objectively" substantially similar; and (4) the trier of fact deter-
mines if the works are "intrinsically" or "subjectively" substantially similar. Brown Bag
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our purposes it is sufficient to note that a critical measure of substantial
similarity is a market-oriented standard: whether consumers that are or-
dinarily in the market for the works at issue would find the works sub-
stantially similar.46 The implied economic rationale for this test is
straightforward: if consumers in the market for a primary work do not
view the alleged derivative work and the primary product as substan-
tially similar, then creators of the primary product will not be injured,
because consumers will not confuse the derivative and primary works
and will not purchase the derivative work instead of the primary work.
The substantial similarity rule has mixed implications for computer
add-ons. With regard to the add-on products themselves, the substantial
similarity rule appears to support the conclusion that most computer
add-ons are not derivative works. Most add-ons are strikingly dissimilar
to the primary products they enhance, and this is why they have value.
A spell-check program is valuable as an add-on only if the primary word
processing program it enhances does not have a similar spell-check func-
tion. For the same reason, it is unlikely that consumers in the market for
a word processing program would find one without a spell-checker to be
substantially similar to an add-on program that only checks spelling. Fi-
nally, because consumers would not confuse the primary product and the
add-on, add-on products will increase the market value of the primary
product by broadening the possible application or utility of that primary
product to include applications that require the functionality of both the
primary product and the add-on.
The substantial similarity rule produces a different and somewhat
contradictory result when applied to integrated works created by the
combination of a primary work and an add-on. When the Game Genie,
for example, is used with Nintendo's products, the result is an audiovi-
sual display that integrates Nintendo's works and the enhancements pro-
vided by the Game Genie. This integrated display arguably meets the
literal requirements of the substantial similarity test: consumers in the
market for video games probably would conclude that audiovisual dis-
plays created through the combined use of Nintendo products and the
Game Genie are substantially similar to those created by Nintendo prod-
ucts alone.
These integrated displays, however, do not meet the requirements of
the market rationale for the substantial similarity test. These integrated
Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198
(1992); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. See, e.g., Data East U.S.A., Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that karate video games were not "substantially similar" because "a discerning 17.5
year old boy could not regard the works as substantially similar").
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displays are not stored in the Game Genie, and they are not separately
available on the market. Indeed, a consumer can only gain access to
integrated audiovisual displays by buying the Game Genie and
Nintendo's products and integrating them. Thus, with regard to inte-
grated works created by the users of add-ons, the "substantial similarity"
rule does not serve its economic rationale: while users can use an add-on
like the Game Genie to create integrated works that are arguably similar
to the primary work, this does not result in any economic injury to pri-
mary producers, because users must buy Nintendo's products to produce
the integrated audiovisual displays.
The fourth and final limitation was articulated by the Ninth Circuit
panel in Galoob in response to this inconsistency between the terms and
rationale of the substantial similarity rule. Rather than find that the au-
diovisual displays created by the combination of the Game Genie and
Nintendo's products were derivative works, the court ignored the terms
of the substantial similarity limitation and directly applied the rationale:
to be a derivative work a computer add-on must supplant the demand for
or reduce the value of the expression fixed in the primary work. Specifi-
cally, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[W]e recognize that technology often advances by improvement rather
than replacement .... Some time ago, for example, computer compa-
nies began marketing spell-checkers that operate within existing word
processors by signalling the writer when a word is misspelled. These
applications, as well as countless others, could not be produced and
marketed if courts were to conclude that the word processor and spell-
checker combination is a derivative work [when compared to] the
word processor alone. The Game Genie is useless by itself.... [It does
not] supplant demand for Nintendo game cartridges. Such innovations
rarel will constitute infringing derivative works under the Copyright
Act.
47
By clarifying that the hallmark of a potentially infringing computer
add-on is that the add-on injures the creator of the primary work by
reducing demand for the protected expression contained in the primary
work in one or more markets, the Ninth Circuit has carved out a broad
exemption that supplements and expands the substantial similarity test
traditionally applied in that Circuit. Under the Galoob analysis, neither
add-on products nor works created through the use of add-on products
should be considered derivative works unless they supplant or replace
existing or potential expression fixed in the primary work at issue. If
Galoob is followed closely by subsequent opinions, the clear implication
47. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir.
1992) (emphasis added). In support of this criterion, the court cited only Nadan, supra note
10.
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is that the majority of computer add-ons will not be viewed as infringing
derivative works.
There are, however, a number of questions raised by Galoob's shift
away from traditional substantial similarity analysis and toward a more
express economic analysis of derivative works, questions that may pre-
vent future courts from closely following Galoob. Given the significance
of market test enunciated in Galoob, we examine these questions in some
detail.
1. The Scope of the Primary Copyright Holder's Protected Interest
First, exactly which of the copyright holder's economic interests are
being protected? Copyright holders may argue that even if an add-on
does not supplant the demand for the expression fixed in the copyrighted
primary work, add-ons do supplant the demand for prospective products,
such as updated versions of the primary work that the copyright holder
might have made in the future.4" To support this argument, copyright
holders might analogize computer add-ons to film adaptations of books,
where it has been held that screenplays infringe the primary author's
right to create a derivative work even when the film does not reduce, and
even increases, market demand for the primary book.49 Copyright hold-
ers might also rely on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Midway Mfg. v.
Artic International.5 0 There, the Seventh Circuit considered computer
add-ons that accelerated the play of Pac Man and Galaxian video
games." While the Pac Man accelerator included a copy of the original
Pac Man program along with the accelerating program code, the Galax-
ian accelerator was a non-replacing product that probably would not be
found to be a derivative work under the Galoob analysis described
above.52 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit found both products to be in-
fringing derivative works because, among other things, the add-ons rep-
48. For example, a copyright holder for version 2.0 of a program containing a large col-
lection of specialty templates and subroutines may argue that consumers will be hesitant to
buy version 3.0 of the same product where many of the enhancements provided by version 3.0
have already been provided by third-party add-ons, and, even where add-ons are not redun-
dant, the consumer would have to discard prior add-ons because they are no longer compatible
with version 3.0. Of course, the primary producer can ameliorate this impact in several ways.
He can price the original at its real value instead of looking to upgrade revenues, or he can
make each upgrade "downwardly compatible," by assuring that add-ons will continue to work.
49. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
50. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1011, 1013.
52. Id. See supra note 28.
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resented products that the copyright holders themselves might have sold
had they thought to invent them.53
This argument has persuasive features, but there is good reason to
believe that it should not prevail and that the Galoob decision will be
followed. Initially, pursuant to section 102(a), a copyright holder can
only receive protection for works fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. Works containing expression that the author has contemplated but
has not fixed in any tangible medium, such as the new features of an
updated version of a primary work, are beyond the scope of the copyright
holder's copyright as defined by section 102(a). Consequently, there is
no injury to an interest protected by copyright when a competitor beats
the copyright holder to market with an add-on that provides these new
features.
On a more fundamental level, the purpose of copyright is to en-
courage innovation in the public interest. Granting copyright holders an
interest in any and all prospective add-ons that may operate with the
copyrighted work would strangle innovation, particularly in the field of
computer products where, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, technol-
ogy has advanced through incremental improvement rather than radical
innovation and replacement. Indeed, it is arguable that the value of
many of the innovations we take for granted today, including spell check-
ers, calendar software, and networking products, were proven at the ex-
pense of third-party add-on developers, and that it is the copyright
holders of the primary works, such as Nintendo, who seek a free ride by
stepping in and taking advantage of a market for enhancements that has
been created through the efforts of third-party add-on developers.
Finally, the film adaptation analogy is not germane. A copyright in
a literary work does not protect the form of publication (such as the fact
that a work was published as a book) but only the elements of expression
in that work, such as the "plot, themes, dialogue, mood" and so forth.54
When a copyrighted novel is adapted to the screen, the author of the
screenplay takes the elements of expression-the plot, characters, etc.-
and exploits the film market for these previously published elements. As
a result, overall demand for these elements of expression in the film mar-
ket is filled and the author of the copyrighted primary novel is injured.
53. Id. at 1014. As discussed infra at notes 75-78 and accompanying text, this has also
been argued to the Ninth Circuit by Nintendo in response to Galoob's claim that works cre-
ated by consumers with the aid of the Game Genie are within the fair use exemption provided
by section 107.
54. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Jason v. Fonda,
526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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In contrast, many computer add-ons do not merely take existing ele-
ments of expression and sell them in a new market. Instead, computer
add-ons normally add new elements of expression, new features, and new
functionality. To follow our literary analogy, computer add-ons add new
characters, new settings, new moods. Creators of computer add-ons do
not profit by selling the existing work of another author in an unex-
ploited market, but by bringing new products to market. 55 Thus, com-
puter add-ons that add new features or enhancements do not supplant
demand for existing elements of expression protected by the copyright in
the primary work, and copyright holders should not be allowed to assert
a protectable interest in all improvements to an existing copyrighted
computer program.
2. The Proper Doctrinal Application of the Market Substitution Test
A second question raised by Galoob is how Galoob's market-oriented
definition of derivative work will be integrated with the other aspects of
copyright law. It may be argued that this sort of economic analysis of
the way add-ons influence demand for primary products is best accom-
plished in the context of the affirmative defense of fair use where, as we
discuss later, there is an express statutory basis for such an analysis.56
Indeed, to the extent the market substitution test has been applied prior
to Galoob, it has been most commonly applied as part of fair use analy-
sis." Furthermore, if the market substitution test is viewed as part of the
definition of a derivative work, rather than as an affirmative defense, it
may overshadow the other limitations used by courts to identify deriva-
tive works as well as the other elements of fair use. Finally, courts may
erroneously leap to the conclusion that a competing product is an in-
fringing work merely because-as an effective competing product-it
reduces demand for the copyrighted product.
58
55. Of course, there are exceptions to this generalization. For example, in SAS Inst., Inc.
v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), the court found an
infringing derivative work where programmers attempted to take an existing statistical analy-
sis program and convert it to another language to allow it to operate exactly as the copyrighted
work operated, except on a different computer. Id.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
57. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
217 (D.N.J. 1977), the court refused to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants
from publishing a personal name index that supplemented the comprehensive New York
Times index published by plaintiff. In particular, the court found that defendant's name index
was likely to be held a fair use of material from plaintiffs comprehensive index, because it did
not supplant the demand for the comprehensive index. Id. at 223-24.
58. This type of error may explain decisions like the Eighth Circuit's in West Publishing
Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070
(1987). In that case, the defendants proposed to provide "star pagination" on their LEXIS on-
line reporting service so that their subscribers could ascertain the corresponding page numbers
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These arguments are persuasive to a degree, but they are not disposi-
tive of the Galoob panel's decision to integrate economic analysis into the
definition of a derivative work. The fact that the definition of derivative
works has been traditionally established by common law, as opposed to
statute, does not make it any less authoritative. Moreover, the risk that
courts will engage in a myopic market oriented analysis is, if anything,
greater in the context of fair use where, as the Supreme Court has stated,
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an un-
fair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of
the copyright. ... "9 We must admit, however, that Galoob's extension
of market analysis to limit the definition of derivative works is new, and
there can be no certainty now that other courts will leap to follow Galoob
in this regard.
D. Summary of Derivative Works Analysis
The statutory definition of derivative works is inherently overbroad.
Until the publication of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Galoob, it was not
clear how traditional common law principles that limit the scope of de-
rivative works doctrine would be applied in the context of computer add-
ons.
The Galoob decision has filled this void by articulating and applying
the four limitations discussed above in the context of computer add-ons.
If Galoob is followed, it is likely that the derivative works right will be
narrowly construed to limit the rights of copyright holders in primary
products and to encourage the use of add-ons. While nearly all add-ons
are interoperable with primary computer products, relatively few incor-
of cases in plaintiff's court reporters. The court, having determined that the sequencing of
cases within the West reporters could constitute sufficient originality to qualify as an indepen-
dently copyrightable compilation, proceeded to affirm a finding of infringement based almost
entirely on the possible market effect of defendant's use: "Since knowledge of the location of
opinions and parts of opinions within West's arrangement is a large part of the reason one
would purchase West's volumes, the LEXIS star pagination feature would adversely affect
West's market position. '[A] use that supplants any part of the normal market for a copy-
righted work would ordinarily be considered an infringement.'" Id. at 1228 (quoting S. REP.
No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975)).
While the Eighth Circuit's sensitivity to the market effect of a purportedly infringing
product was laudable, the panel may have reached a different conclusion if market effect had
been properly considered as just one part of a broader derivative work or fair use analysis. The
defendant, for example, had a strong argument that by using page numbers, defendant made
use of an insubstantial portion of West's work, made a use that was essential in view of the
nature of both the copyrighted and infringing works, and made a use that served the strong
public interest in creating a uniform system of reference regarding judicial opinions. The iso-
lated reliance on market effect in West Publishing appears to have foreclosed consideration of
these factors.
59. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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porate a sufficient amount of protected material from the primary work
to support a finding that these add-ons incorporate infringing copies of
material from the primary work, or reduce market demand for the pri-
mary works they enhance. In addition, as long as add-ons remain com-
ponent works that require consumers to use them in conjunction with
separately purchased primary works, there is no economic rationale for
finding that integrated works resulting from the use of add-ons are
infringing.
III
Sweat of the Brow and Moral Rights
While the Galoob decision should be considered the leading case in
the area of derivative works doctrine as applied to computer add-ons, it
obviously exists in the context of the long history of derivative works
analysis in the common law generally. This history provides a number of
arguments that advocates in future computer add-on litigation are likely
to raise. There is no room here to deal with all of these legal theories.
There are, however, two arguments that are so commonly raised by
plaintiffs in copyright infringement litigation that they are almost certain
to arise in computer add-on cases: (1) add-on producers are free riders
who are profiting from the sweat of another's brow; and (2) computer
add-ons infringe the moral rights of the producers of primary works by
altering (an advocate might say "mutilating") the primary work. Briefly
below we discuss our view that neither of these doctrines applies to alter
the scope of the definition of derivative works in the context of computer
add-ons.
A. Sweat of the Brow
Much of the intuitive appeal of the plaintiffs' position in cases such
as Galoob has nothing to do with the letter or spirit of the Copyright Act.
Instead, the average party (and often the average judge) has a visceral
reaction that it is just not fair for a company like Galoob to come along
and, without license, take a purported free ride on the hard work, inge-
nuity, and market share of a primary producer such as Nintendo. This
"sweat of the brow" doctrine is rooted in common law notions of prop-
erty, and in the past controlled many areas of copyright law.' Copy-
60. For example, a long line of telephone directory and map-making cases is based on
"sweat of the brow." See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128
(8th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 683 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1988). But see Rockford Map Pub-
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right law, on the other hand, is at least nominally unconcerned with
rewarding the effort of authors. Its rationale is exclusively policy-based.
The intended beneficiary of copyright protection is society as a whole;
that individual authors may benefit is merely a means to that end and is
not in any sense grounded in a right of the author, independent of the
Copyright Act. Moreover, any such independent right of ownership
under the common law is, at least since 1978, expressly preempted by the
Copyright Act.61
In 1991, the Supreme Court exorcised the anomaly of the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine, at least in the case of telephone directories. In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,62 a unanimous Court
held that simply alphabetizing telephone listings did not exhibit the ad-
mittedly minimal originality required for copyright.63 We believe that
Feist is dispositive, and that the "sweat of the brow" doctrine should
have no application to computer add-ons. Despite this holding, however,
the underlying intuitive tug of "sweat of the brow" will likely continue to
be a useful tool for plaintiffs.
B. Moral Rights
Similarly, the European doctrine of moral rights, or "droit moral, '""
occasionally finds its way into American copyright cases. For example,
in Galoob Nintendo argued that the Game Genie usurped Nintendo's
exclusive right to "protect the Nintendo culture" by determining in what
way Nintendo's works could be altered.
Moral rights, however, are for the most part expressly excluded
from American copyright law.6 5 Congress has recently acted to define
lishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986).
61. Section 301 of the 1976 Act declares that the federal statute preempts all common and
state copyright law.
62. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
63. Expressly rejecting the "sweat of the brow" rationale, the Court stated that:
This decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural's efforts in compiling its
directory, but rather as making clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort.
As this Court noted more than a century ago, "great praise may be due to the plain-
tiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not
contemplate their being rewarded in this way."
Id. at 1297 (citation omitted).
64. An author in a moral rights jurisdiction has the right: (a) to have his name appear on
copies of his work; (b) to prevent the attribution to him of another's work; and (c) to prevent
the reproduction of his work in a distorted or degrading form. See generally H.R. REP. No.
514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 114-15 (1990).
65. In 1988, the United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention, the interna-
tional copyright convention that, among other things, recognizes moral rights. Berne Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2858 (codified as amended in scattered
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more clearly the scope of moral rights protection in copyright law, enact-
ing the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.66 In an attempt to better con-
form the Copyright Act to the terms of the Berne Convention, the Act
extended moral rights of integrity to a limited class of visual works only.
The works covered are only visual works of fine art (defined in terms of a
small number of copies), and expressly excluded are "any ...motion
picture or other audio visual work."67 Thus Congress has clearly indi-
cated that audiovisual works, probably including computer programs,
are not eligible for moral rights protection.
Neither sweat of the brow nor moral rights should limit an add-on
producer's rights under the Copyright Act. Both of these doctrines,
however, have demonstrated remarkable staying power in the market-
place of ideas, and will likely continue to appear at least implicitly in
future litigation. Practitioners defending add-on products should be pre-
pared to identify and defend against such arguments, while practitioners
attacking add-ons may wish to incorporate the intuitive appeal of those
arguments, even if they are legally flawed.
IV
Affirmative Defenses to Infringement
As noted at the outset, even if an add-on is found to be a derivative
work, it will not be considered an infringing derivative work if the crea-
tion of the derivative work is excused by any of a number of exemptions
and defenses expressed in sections 107 through 120 of the Copyright Act.
Defendants in copyright cases dealing with computer products com-
monly raise two of these defenses: the fair use defense stated in section
107 and the statutory exemption for certain uses of computer programs
stated in section 117. The fair use defense, in particular, has recently
been applied in Galoob, as well as the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega
sections of 17 U.S.C.). In implementing the Beme Convention, however, Congress was ex-
plicit in stating that:
(b) Certain Rights Not Affected. The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adher-
ence of the United States thereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations there-
under, do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed
under Federal, State, or the common law-
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the work ....
17 U.S.C. § 101. In so doing, Congress made clear that, despite our obligations under the
Convention, it is the position of the United States that American authors are provided the
required moral rights protections by sources of law outside of the Copyright Act.
66. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp.
1991)).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.68 We examine the applicability of the
fair use defense and section 117 to computer add-ons below.
A. Fair Use
Section 107 provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is
not an infringement of copyright."69 To determine whether or not a
given use is a fair use, section 107 directs the court to consider four
factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted
work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.7°
These factors are not intended to be exhaustive.71 They have
proven, nonetheless, to be a comprehensive guide for the Ninth Circuit in
cases involving computer products. We consider each of these factors
separately. While the Ninth Circuit has consistently worked to expand
the applicability of the fair use defense to interoperable computer prod-
ucts such as add-ons, in so doing it has articulated different and often
contradictory doctrinal rationales for its interpretation of the fair use fac-
tors. As a result, it is difficult to tell exactly how this defense might be
applied in future cases. Nonetheless, the better view is the one suggested
by the Ninth Circuit's Sega opinion: because add-ons are interoperable
component works, producers and consumers of add-ons should be per-
mitted to make a fair use of the primary work to the extent necessary to
install the add-on and insure that enhancements provided by the add-on
are interoperable with the existing features of the primary work.72
1. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the
Copyrighted Work
The fourth fair use factor, an add-on's effect on the market for or
value of the primary product, is often considered to be the most impor-
68. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER, supra note 35, § 13.05[A], at 102.8 ("The factors contained in
Section 107 are merely by way of example, and are not necessarily an exhaustive
enumeration.").
72. At least one recent decision, however, has construed the right to copy for interoper-
ability purposes narrowly. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., No. C88-4805
FMS (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1993), the court held that Atari's game cartridges infringed
Nintendo's copyrighted "lock-out" sequence because Atari had copied additional code not
strictly necessary to unlock Nintendo's console.
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tant.73 As we have already discussed, many (if not most) computer add-
ons do not have a negative effect on the market for the relevant primary
works because add-ons typically do not replace or supplant the primary
work. Instead, they expand the utility of the primary work and open
new markets that would be otherwise unavailable. It would seem, then,
that this fair use factor, which has traditionally been used to emphasize
market analysis, 74 would be one that weighs heavily in favor of finding
that most add-ons make fair use of any material copied into the add-on
itself. Surprisingly, however, the Ninth Circuit's recent decisions in
Galoob and Sega are divided on how this factor should be applied to
computer products. This split appears to arise from two different notions
of the "potential market" for the primary copyrighted computer prod-
ucts at issue.
In Galoob, after finding that the audiovisual displays created by
users of the Game Genie were not derivative works, the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless assumed arguendo that these displays were derivative, ap-
plied the four fair use factors, and found that these displays were a "fair
use" of Nintendo materials. 7" Regarding the fourth fair use factor, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted this factor in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Stewart v. Abend,76 which held that an unlicensed film adaptation
had a negative effect on the potential market for the expression contained
in a copyrighted novel. 77 By analogy, the Ninth Circuit held that the
"potential market" for Nintendo's copyrighted computer works included
the potential market for new products that Nintendo might produce in
the future, which included the enhancements added by the Game Genie.
The Ninth Circuit went on, however, to find that because Nintendo in
fact had no plans to exploit this market, Nintendo had failed to establish
a record demonstrating market-related injury.78 Consequently, on the
unique facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit found that the fourth fair use
factor weighed in favor of the Game Genie and against Nintendo.
The definition of the "potential market" for Nintendo's products
that was applied in Galoob broadly restricts the applicability of the fair
73. "The fourth factor is the 'most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.' " Stew-
art v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 35, § 13.05[A], at 13-
81).
74. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 223
(D.N.J. 1977) (finding that defendant's name index was a fair use of plaintiff's index to New
York Times articles because, among other things, defendant's focused index only referred to
plaintiff's index, and, therefore, did not supplant or reduce demand for plaintiff's index); 3
NIMMER, supra note 35, § 13.05[B], at 13-102.10 (discussing Nimmer's "functionality" test).
75. 964 F.2d 965, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1992).
76. 495 U.S. at 236.
77. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971.
78. Id. at 971-72.
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use defense in future add-on cases. By finding that the "potential mar-
ket" for a copyrighted primary work includes the market for updates
that add the new features provided by the relevant add-on, the Ninth
Circuit held, in essence, that every computer add-on has a negative effect
on the theoretical potential market for the primary work at issue, because
this "potential market" includes the market for the features added by the
add-on. Thus, to prevail on the fourth factor under Galoob, a copyright
holder need only show a good faith intention to exploit the market for
the feature provided by the add-on at some point in the future.
Fortunately for add-on producers, the Galoob decision is not the
Ninth Circuit's final word on the fourth fair use factor, or the "potential
market" that the court should consider when applying that factor. After
Galoob, the Ninth Circuit again considered the fourth fair use factor in
the context of computer products in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc.79 In Sega, defendant and appellant Accolade developed video game
programs designed to operate on the Genesis video game computer sold
by plaintiff and appellee Sega.8° Accolade admitted that during develop-
ment of its game programs it used a decompiler to create verbatim copies
of copyrighted Sega game programs and then included in its own games
certain interface specifications copied from Sega copyrighted manuals.8"
Accolade argued, however, that this copying was essential to render Ac-
colade's games operable on Sega's computer, and that this copying was,
therefore, a fair use. The Ninth Circuit agreed and found Accolade's
copying to be a fair use.82
In finding for Accolade, the Ninth Circuit applied an interpretation
of the fourth fair use factor different than that adopted in Galoob. In
Sega, the Ninth Circuit ignored the possibility that Sega may have
wanted to market its own games offering the features of the games sold
by Accolade. Instead, the Ninth Circuit criticized Sega for attempting to
monopolize the market on innovative games that could operate on Sega's
computer.8 3 Indeed, the Sega panel found that Sega's attempt to rely on
minimal copying as a basis for excluding innovative games from the mar-
ket for Genesis-compatible games ran counter to the fundamental pur-
poses of copyright and could not "constitute a strong equitable basis for
resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine."8 4 Under Sega, then, the
"potential market" for the primary work is limited to markets for the
existing copyrighted work, and any attempt by the copyright holder in
79. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 1514.
81. Id. at 1514-15.
82. Id. at 1520.
83. Id. at 1524.
84. Id.
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the primary work to control the use' of products that add new features or
operations to the primary work runs counter to the purposes of copyright
and should prevent a copyright holder from defeating a claim of fair use.
Whether the Sega or Galoob view will be followed in future cases
involving allegations that add-ons are derivative works is a close call.
The Galoob opinion is clearly the more germane precedent because it
deals directly with an add-on product that is alleged to be an infringing
derivative work. The Sega opinion, however, has what we believe to be
the better analysis for a number of reasons.
As we have already discussed, and contrary to Galoob, many com-
puter add-ons are not analogous to screenplays, which merely rehash in
the medium of film the characters, setting, and other elements of copy-
righted expression previously published in a copyrighted novel. Com-
puter add-ons typically add new features that were absent from the
copyrighted work. In this context, the "potential market" for the copy-
righted primary work should not extend to include innovative and origi-
nal expression that is not fixed in the primary work and is provided only
by the add-on. As the Sega opinion correctly notes, to find otherwise
would extend the monopoly power of the copyright holder to encompass
new expressions and innovations that are not fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression and are not original to the copyright holder but
rather developed through effort and expense of third parties. Such a find-
ing conflicts with the statutory requirements of section 102(a) and the
fundamental purposes of copyright.8 5
2. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor, "the purpose and character of the use," is
the second most significant fair use factor. Private or educational uses
are favored by this factor, and commercial uses are often said to be "pre-
sumptively unfair" and, therefore, inappropriate for the fair use de-
fense.8 6 At first glance, it appears that most add-ons would run afoul of
this fair use factor. Add-ons themselves are produced and sold commer-
cially, and many of the most valuable add-ons are those that are used by
businesses to customize primary products to suit their unique needs. The
Galoob and Sega panels, however, worked hard to reach a different con-
clusion-although they have again offered differing doctrinal rationales
for applying the fair use defense to the products before them.
85. We do not mean to suggest that innovations are not protected until they are ready for
the retail market. Nonetheless, these innovations must be sufficiently set out to meet the re-
quirements of section 102(a).




In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit avoided the commercial character of
the Game Genie by focusing on the audiovisual displays created by users
of the Game Genie.87 The court found that these displays were "pre-
sumptively fair" because these displays were not created for a commer-
cial purpose but rather for the private enjoyment of each consumer.8"
This ruling, while helpful for the Game Genie, interprets the first fair use
factor in a way that is adverse to add-ons generally, because it implies
that the fair use defense will not be available for add-ons used in a com-
mercial setting.
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit revisited the first factor and again offered
an interpretation more favorable to add-on producers than that offered in
Galoob. Because defendant Accolade's allegedly infringing games were
undisputedly created for commercial sale, the Sega panel could not re-
treat to the private use analysis relied on in Galoob. Instead, the Ninth
Circuit asserted a distinction between approved and disapproved com-
mercial activity based on the policy purposes of copyright. Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit found that Accolade's business plan was not to profit
by simply taking Sega's copyrighted material and reselling it. 9 This sort
of activity, which the Ninth Circuit characterized as a "direct" commer-
cial use of Sega's material, would be a disapproved use that would have
weighed against a finding of fair use. 9° Instead, Accolade's plan was to
profit by bringing new and innovative products to market, and Sega's
copyrighted material was only copied to the extent necessary to allow
Accolade's component products to enter the market by interacting with
Sega's products.9 The Ninth Circuit characterized this plan as making
an "indirect" commercial use of Sega materials and found that it served
the fundamental purpose of copyright: to encourage competition be-
tween creative, innovative products in the marketplace.92 Moreover, be-
cause Accolade made only an "indirect" commercial use of Sega's
material, Accolade overcame the presumption of unfairness that nor-
mally attaches to all commercial uses. 93
As with the fourth fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit's view of the
first factor must be seen as uncertain, although Sega again appears to
take the better position. While the Galoob panel was ready to extend
traditional presumptions against any commercial use directly to the con-
text of computer add-ons, the Sega panel was ready and willing to con-
87. 964 F.2d at 970.
88. Id.
89. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1523.
93. Id.
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sider the unique need for computer products to be interoperable with
other hardware and software products before they can even enter the
market. Because many add-ons arguably make only "indirect" use of
copyrighted primary works, there is some basis for believing that the
Sega opinion will overshadow Galoob's view of the first fair use factor in
the future.
3. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
"The nature of the copyrighted work" is the second fair use factor
enumerated in section 107. While traditionally viewed as less important
than the first and fourth fair use factors, there is reason to believe that
this second factor will become critically important in the area of com-
puter add-ons because it will allow courts to recognize the special need of
computer products to maintain technical interoperability with other
computer products. As we have noted already, nearly all computer
products must be interoperable to enter the marketplace. Moreover, in
many cases interoperability can only be achieved by either copying a por-
tion of the primary work into the add-on or creating a third work that
integrates the add-on with the primary work when the add-on is used by
consumers. Thus, the nature of primary computer products and add-ons
militates in favor of finding that copying necessary to allow interoper-
ability is fair use. Once again, however, the Ninth Circuit failed to take
this approach in Galoob and has only come around to this view more
recently in Sega.
In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that
the nature of Nintendo's copyrighted works supported a finding of fair
use because Nintendo's works had been widely published throughout the
United States.94 The Galoob rule, if followed, is not adverse to most add-
ons. In fact, the most attractive add-on markets are those related to the
most widely published primary works. Nonetheless, because the Galoob
ruling fails to focus on the nature of computer technology generally, it
remains a ruling that is confined by its facts, and may or may not favor
free use of add-ons in future cases.
The Sega opinion takes a position that is more clearly focused on
computer technology. There, the Ninth Circuit found that the program
code necessary to render Accolade's game interoperable with Sega's was
purely functional in nature because using Sega's interoperability codes
was essential to allow any program to function on Sega's Genesis com-
puter.95 Because Sega's copyrighted interoperability code was functional
in nature, the Ninth Circuit found that copyright provided it little or no
94. 964 F.2d at 971.
95. 977 F.2d at 1526.
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protection.96 Given the functional and thinly protected nature of Sega's
code, the Ninth Circuit found that it was fundamentally fair for Acco-
lade to copy this code while studying the functional requirements of
Sega's computer when marketing its own interoperable games.9 7 The
Sega panel noted that a contrary holding would grant Sega an improper
monopoly over the functionality of its Genesis computer, and that this
sort of monopoly was the exclusive purview of patents, not copyrights.
98
While add-on producers remain stuck with Galoob's analysis of the
second fair use factor at present, we believe that the Sega view will be
more widely followed as the Ninth Circuit becomes increasingly ac-
quainted with the interoperability requirements of computer technology.
4. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation to the
Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The third enumerated fair use factor, "the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion used," is one that, taken on its face, also appears to be
adverse to many computer add-ons, because add-ons typically add only
one or two features to the primary work. As a result, the integrated
product of the add-on and the primary work is substantially made up of
the primary work, and the amount of the primary work used might be
viewed as quite large.
The Galoob and Sega decisions, however, have construed the third
fair use factor in a fashion that renders it less significant in the context of
computer products. In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit analogized any copy-
ing incidental to the use of the Game Genie to the copying incidental to
the use of a video recorder,99 approved by the Supreme Court in Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. "o There, the Supreme Court held
that, because copying an entire program was essential to the non-infring-
ing activity of viewing television programs at different times, the fact the
entire program was copied did not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use.'10 Similarly, because creating a work con-
structed entirely out of Nintendo's copyrighted audiovisual displays is
96. Id. The Ninth Circuit relied here on common law doctrines excluding facts and useful
articles from copyright protection. Id. at 1524 (citing inter alia, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
102-04 (1879); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991), as
well as the statutory exclusion of processes and functions articulated by the legislature in sec-
tion 102(b)) (quoting the CONTU Report, supra note 29, at 20: "[W]hen specific instructions,
even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given
task, their later use by another will not amount to infringement.").
97. 977 F.2d at 1526.
98. Id.
99. 964 F.2d at 971.
100. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
101. Id. at 449-50.
Vol. 15:615
ADD-ON INFRINGEMENTS: GALOOB V. NINTENDO
essential to making use of the non-infringing enhancements offered by
the Game Genie, the substantiality of the copying could be discounted
and did not prevent a finding of fair use."2 In Sega, the Ninth Circuit
cited Sony and reached a similar conclusion without substantial
discussion. 103
The analysis offered in Galoob and followed without discussion in
Sega is directly applicable to most add-ons. In order to provide the con-
sumer the enhancements offered by most add-ons, they must be inte-
grated with, or used in conjunction with, the relevant primary works.
Hence, it appears that the third fair use factor will be consistently applied
in the Ninth Circuit to find that add-ons make fair use of any material
copied from the primary work at issue.
5. Summary of Fair Use Analysis
While recent Ninth Circuit decisions evince a consistent intention to
broaden the applicability of the fair use defense to computer add-ons, the
Ninth Circuit's differing implementations of this intention in Sega and
Galoob have left the doctrinal basis for this expansion confused. As the
courts become increasingly familiar with the nature and requirements of
computer technology, they will likely gravitate toward an analysis of fair
use factors suggested by the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sega: because
computer add-ons must interact with other products to deliver their new
features and enhancements, computer add-ons must be allowed to make
a fair use of any copyrighted material necessary to render the add-ons
compatible and interoperable.
B. Section 117
A second affirmative defense to copyright infringement provides po-
tentially sweeping protection to a wide variety of add-ons: the defense
based on the provisions of section 117." As we set out below, while the
scope of this section as it concerns commercially exploited copying is not
yet defined, at a minimum section 117 should be seen as exempting from
infringement virtually any private alteration of a copyrighted program.
As a result, section 117 should exempt most add-ons from claims assert-
ing that they are, or create, infringing derivative works.
In expanding the concept of "copy" to include machine-readable
code, the drafters of the Copyright Act recognized that any user of a
copyrighted computer program, by loading that program into memory,
102. 964 F.2d at 971.
103. 977 F.2d at 1526.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
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would create a potentially infringing copy of that program. 105 In order
to avoid that result, section 117 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or au-
thorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued pos-
session of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
10 6
Thus, section 117 establishes two distinct but related affirmative de-
fenses to infringement. Pursuant to subsection (2), a lawful owner of
copyrighted software may make additional copies of that software for
archival purposes to guard against accidental destruction of the primary
copy. Pursuant to subsection (1), a lawful owner may also make adapta-
tions "essential" to the use of the software.
The exemption stated in subsection (2) is relatively uncontroversial,
as the Act takes pains to insure that such an archival copy cannot be
used to the benefit of anyone other than the original rightful owner.
10 7
This exemption is also largely irrelevant to computer add-ons, where
copying of the primary work occurs not for archival purposes, but for the
purpose of taking advantage of whatever features are provided by the
add-on.
The exemption stated in subsection (1), however, that the owner
may make adaptations "essential" to the use of the program, is subject to
two different interpretations, based upon who is to determine the "essen-
tiality" of the use. The interpretation chosen is of critical importance to
computer add-ons.
The narrow, or "author-subjective" reading, is that subsection (1)
exempts only modifications absolutely necessary to make the program
run on the user's machine in the form and with the features intended by
the copyright holder."°0 Under this interpretation, the scope of the ex-
105. CONTU Report, supra note 29, at 11.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
107. But see Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (section
117(2) archival right limited to preservation of programs where there is a likelihood of acci-
dental erasure).
108. This restrictive, "author-subjective" reading finds some support in the CONTU Re-
port, which stated that the adaptation right of section 117(1) allows a rightful possessor to
adapt a program only "to that extent which will permit its use by that possessor." CONTU
Report, supra note 29, at 13. Further, "[t]he intent of that section [117] is to provide a legiti-
mate holder of a computer program with permission to do that copying of the program which
is necessary for him to use it in his computer without running afoul of possible infringement
actions." Transcript of CONTU Meeting No. 19, at 98-99 (Jan. 1978). The CONTU Report,
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ception is limited to, for example, "porting over" to another language, or
"patching" (commonly accomplished by an installer program) in order
to set the program up for the user's unique combination of CPU, mem-
ory, monitor, and printer. This "author-subjective" reading would limit
the applicability of the section 117(1) defense to add-ons that the copy-
right holder knew of and intended the user to apply. As a result, the
"author-subjective" reading of section 117(1) would prevent virtually all
new innovative add-ons from taking advantage of a section 117(1)
defense. 109
The broader or "user-subjective" view of section 117(1) is that this
section entitles the rightful owner to customize the program to whatever
extent he wishes, adding features at will, so long as he does not distribute
the resulting program to others." ° Here, in other words, "essential" is
construed to mean essential to the lawful owner's intentions and pur-
poses, rather than to the copyright holder's, and any modifications con-
sistent with the lawful owner's purposes would be allowed as long as the
owner does not enter the marketplace by attempting to transfer his or her
adapted program."'
For a number of reasons, the "user-subjective" interpretation of sec-
tion 117(1) is the better view. First, the "user-subjective" interpretation
is consistent with the market impact rationale that has played such a
prominent role in recent interpretations of derivative works doctrine
however, also makes clear that the primary concern in limiting the scope of the adaptation
right was not the nature of the adaptation itself, but rather that "this permission would not
extend to other copies of the program." CONTU Report, supra, at 13. One court has held
that "[t]he right to internal use should not include the right to make the work available to
outsiders via a computer network or otherwise." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (citation omitted).
To date, those cases that have applied a restrictive reading of section 117 have done so in
situations where the adaptation was subsequently distributed to other persons. See, e.g., Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype
Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.
Ill. 1983); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450
(D. Idaho 1983). But see Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 622 (as an alternative ground, copy
made by defendant not "essential," as less permanent forms of copying available; copying and
adaptation in question was "a convenient method of utilizing [program], but not 'essential'.
'Essential' means indispensable and necessary. This method is neither.").
109. Note that the "author-subjective" reading of section 117 is noticeably similar to the
notion of moral rights, discussed supra at notes 64-67 and accompanying text, and should be
eschewed for that reason alone.
110. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (re-
jecting claim that "in no other manner" means only for the author's intended purpose). On
the other hand, the court in Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 617, found that copies made of
Apple's operating system were not privileged, as they were included in and resold with defend-
ant's computer; section 117 precludes the vending of adapted copies without the copyright
holder's permission.
111. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 261.
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under section 106(2) and fair use doctrine under section 107.112 As long
as users must acquire the primary work before making adaptations, and
as long as they cannot transfer their adapted program, then adaptations
accomplished by users-with or without the assistance of add-on prod-
ucts-only increase the demand for, and value of, primary works by in-
creasing the primary product's range of applications.
Second, a "user-subjective" interpretation of section 117(1) is con-
sistent with the purpose of copyright to encourage innovation in the pub-
lic interest. A user, who has already paid full market price for a primary
product, should not be denied the opportunity to make an innovative use
of that product under circumstances where such an innovative use can-
not injure an interest protected by copyright. The "author-subjective"
interpretation of section 117(1), in contrast, would stifle innovation by
limiting the applications of a primary product only to those applications
foreseen by the author and copyright holders.
Finally, the "user-subjective" interpretation is arguably supported
by the legislative history of section 117(1) as provided by the CONTU
Report, which states that software users have "the right to add features
to the program that were not present at the time of rightful
acquisition." 1 '
3
Despite the advantages of a "user-subjective" interpretation of sec-
tion 117(1), we must admit that cases applying section 117(1) are scant,
and the application of section 117(1) is currently unresolved. There is,
however, a growing trend toward the "user-subjective" view. A number
of cases have adopted this view to exempt adaptations carried out in pri-
vate, non-commercial settings.II4 While some courts are loath to extend
this reading to cases in which the adaptation is an integral step in bring-
ing a competing product to market,11 5 other courts under section 117(1)
have proven willing to extend adaptation rights into potentially competi-
tive situations as well. For example, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
112. See supra discussion at notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
113. CONTU Report, supra note 29, at 13. CONTU, however, considered that such adap-
tation rights would "necessarily be more private in nature than the right to load a program by
copying it." Id.
114. See, e.g., Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 746 F. Supp.
520 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (section 117 allows "essential use" copying either to allow use on a partic-
ular computer or to add additional features); Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F.
Supp. 1006, 1009-10 (D. Kan. 1989) (owner's enhancement exclusively for in-house use privi-
leged under § 117).
115. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (narrow reading of "essential" where defendant copied lawfully owned disks to ROM
chips for resale with their computers); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1520 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Section 117 does not purport to protect a user who disassembles object
code, converts it from assembly into source code, and makes printouts and photocopies of the
refined source code version.").
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Ltd.,6 the court found that adaptation and disassembly of the plaintiff's
copy-protection software was privileged under section 117, even though
the end purpose of that disassembly was the creation of a product that
rendered the plaintiff's product virtually worthless." 7
Thus, while it is early to state with certainty how section 117(1) will
be applied, it is evolving toward a "user-subjective" interpretation. This
is a desirable trend. The "user-subjective" view of section 117(1) is both
consistent with trends in the application of sections 106 and 107 and
consistent with the purpose of copyright to encourage innovation. Until
further interpretation, however, the best course for practitioners is to as-
sume that courts will not apply section 117 to immunize adaptations
where the end result is competitive harm to the original copyright holder.
V
Conclusion
The growing installed base of primary computer products in homes
and businesses has led to the creation of a substantial market in add-ons
and peripherals that can be used by consumers to broaden and customize
the application of the primary computer products they already own. Un-
til recently, it was unclear how traditional copyright doctrines would be
construed in the context of computer add-ons. Because add-ons are, by
definition, interoperable component works that rely for their value on
their ability to enhance the operations of other copyrighted programs, it
was feared by some (and hoped by others) that the doctrine of derivative
works would be broadly construed to find that add-ons are, or contribute
to the creation of, infringing derivative works.
In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit rejected this broad interpretation of the
derivative works doctrine. The court held that an infringing derivative
work must embody sufficient protected material in a permanent or con-
116. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 261. As in the interpretation of derivative works doctrine, the most intriguing
cases arise in the context of commercial products that facilitate otherwise privileged private
adaptations. One such case is Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.
1984), where the plaintiff published a magazine, Nibble, which included hardcopy of programs
that users of the Apple II computer could "hand enter" into their computers. Nibble also sold
usable disks of those programs. The defendant styled itself a "typing service." For a fee lower
than Nibble, it would provide lawful purchasers of the magazine, who had an uncontested
right to type in the programs themselves, a disk copy instead. The court found for the plaintiff,
thus holding that while the readers could type in the program themselves, they could not hire
another to do the typing. The underlying difficulty with this case is that it examined the
impact not on the copyrighted hardcopy of the magazine at issue, but on the separate disk
product the plaintiff also sold. Thus, Micro-Sparc considers only the effect of creating an iden-
tical competing copy of a primary work, and does not truly consider the scope of a user's right
to adapt a lawfully owned program to his or her own use.
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crete form to result in the creation of a work that substantially affects the
copyright holder's interests by supplanting market demand for the pri-
mary work or by reducing the primary work's market value. In reaching
this result, and in interpreting the doctrine of fair use in Sega, the Ninth
Circuit has demonstrated a growing appreciation of computer technol-
ogy, including the importance of interoperability and the significant in-
novations that will be foregone if the producers of primary products are
allowed to use copyright to exclude interoperable programs from the
marketplace. The growing technical sophistication of the courts provides
reason to believe that the trend toward limiting the power of the copy-
right holder with regard to interoperable products developed by others
will continue in the future.
